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Abstract
Social engineering exploits vulnerabilities at different layers (i.e. technical, social layer) in an
organizational defense structure. It is therefore important to understand how to defend against
these attacks using a holistic defense approach including multiple countermeasures. The
literature suggests a plethora of countermeasures, little research has however been done to assess
their effectiveness in managing social engineering threats. In this paper we attempt to obtain a
deeper understanding of how to defend against a type of social engineering attack that attempts
to install malware on computers through e-mail or portable media. We explore commonly
proposed countermeasures needed to prevent this type of attack, and if any dependencies
between them exist. Through a combined method approach of surveying the literature and
conducting semi-structured interviews with domain experts we identified a set of
countermeasures that provide empirical input for future studies but could potentially also give
organizations guidance on how to manage social engineering-based malware installation attacks.
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1. Introduction
The increased effectiveness and robustness of technical security components has made it more
difficult to successfully introduce malware on computer systems using purely technical means.
Many attackers have therefore started to include social means in their malicious efforts and target
the humans accessing and using the computers (Applegate, 2009). These types of attacks are
commonly known as social engineering attacks. In organizational settings, typical social
engineering attacks include deceptive methods to make an organizational member comply with a
malicious request, e.g. execute malware on a computer or install malware through portable media
(Mitnick & Simon, 2002). Numerous papers have focused on describing social engineering
concepts and proposed a plethora of different countermeasure including technical controls, user
interventions and organizational security policies. However, the effectiveness of these
approaches has largely remained anecdotal. The existing empirical research has largely focused
on success rates of certain types of social engineering attacks or analyzing characteristics that
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influence an individual’s susceptibility to social engineering attacks. In Bakhshi, Papadaki, &
Furnell (2009) an experiment was conducted in where a phishing mail was sent out to
organizational employees as a mean to assess the probability of malware being successfully
installed on their computers. In the study by Pattinson, Jerram, Parsons, McCormac, &
Butavicius (2012) it was found that familiarity with computers and cognitive impulsivity affected
an individual’s susceptibility to phishing. These results provide indications of how susceptible an
organization is to social engineering, but no information is given on how to effectively counter
these attacks and most importantly, which countermeasures that are effective when employed in
an organization given different scenarios, i.e., the type of attack they counter. From a
practitioner’s point of view, it’s challenging to practically assess the effectiveness of
countermeasures. It is therefore, with no doubt, useful to know if there are countermeasures that
are more effective than others and if some combinations of countermeasure are better than
others.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the effectiveness of commonly proposed
countermeasures against two types of social engineering-based malware installation attacks:
phishing and malware installation through portable media. To effectively defend against social
engineering attacks the strategy need to include multiple countermeasures that are structured and
combined in a holistic approach (Applegate, 2009). We therefore attempt to understand if any
dependencies between countermeasures exist. We aim to fulfill this purpose through a combined
method approach in where we first identify relevant countermeasures by performing a literature
review and then obtain opinions on the perceived effectiveness of the countermeasures by
conducting semi-structured interviews with domain experts.
The rest of the paper unfolds as follows. The next section presents social engineering attacks and
countermeasures discussed in the literature. The section that follows presents how the data
collection was conducted in order to obtain a deeper understating of social engineering malware
installation attacks and countermeasures. Then, the results of the data collection are presented
and discussed. The final section concludes the paper.

2. Theoretical framework
While there have been many papers describing social engineering and its components in detail
(e.g. (Applegate, 2009)(Hong, 2012)(Mitnick & Simon, 2002)) there is, to the knowledge of the
authors, no holistic approach that have examined the effectiveness of countermeasures and their
potential dependencies, given different scenarios. This section provides a basis for understanding
the linkages between two social engineering-based malware installation attacks (phishing and
malware installation through portable media) and countermeasures commonly proposed in the
literature that will be discussed during the interviews.

2.1 Social engineering-based malware installation attacks
Phishing is described as the marriage between technology and social engineering in which
attackers use spoofed email messages to trick end-users into taking a suggested action that
benefits the attacker (Nohlberg & Kowalski, 2008). For instance, the attacker can convince endusers to reply with sensitive information such as user credentials or click on a malicious link
where the attacker either: i) automatically introduce malware by exploiting vulnerabilities in the

2

web browser (e.g. drive by download) or ii) persuade end-users to execute malware on their
computers. Malware can also be executed through hidden scripts in attached documents.
Malware installation using portable media is the practice of using a combination of technical
and social attack methods. For instance, an attacker can send a valuable gift (e.g. an Ipad) to a
potential victim or leave a USB memory stick with a tempting text, outside a building, to entice a
victim’s curiosity into using the item in their computer (Nohlberg & Kowalski, 2008).

2.2 Countermeasures
Countermeasures against social engineering- based malware installation attacks can be
categorized as organizational security policies, user security interventions and technical controls.
In the following, countermeasures proposed in the literature are presented.

2.2.1 Organizational security policies
Organizational security policies are developed and maintained to get employees to perform
behavior that is conducive to the protection of information assets in the enterprise (A. Da Veiga
& Eloff, 2010).
Internet use policy addresses and restricts employee Internet usage (e.g. usage of social network
sites during work hours) (Hasan & Prajapati, 2009),(A. D. Veiga & Eloff, 2007).
Acceptable installation policy addresses software installation privileges and restricts additional
software installation on users’ computers (Nohlberg & Kowalski, 2008).
Hardware policy addresses the acceptable use and disposal of hardware (e.g. computers,
portable media) that can contain either sensitive information or malware (Hasan & Prajapati,
2009).
Separation of duties policy has the primary objective to prevent that a single deception or
breach of trust is sufficient to compromise a system. In theory, the policy can prevent an attacker
from gaining access of information when deceiving one victim as it may require more than one
victim to deceive for accessing the targeted information. This may discourage the attacker and
thus lower the probability of success (Nohlberg & Kowalski, 2008),(Botha & Eloff, 2001).

2.2.2 User interventions
User interventions are often seen as an important to counter social engineering attacks and often
carried out through formal training, workshops, lectures or through IT-based training tools.
Awareness education and training program increases the user knowledge of general IT
security threats and threats related to social engineering malware. Further, the training should
inform the user on common manipulative techniques and educate the user to recognize and react
to an attack (Applegate, 2009), (Mitnick & Simon, 2002).
Verification and authorization procedures educate users that they need verify the identity of
the person requesting a type of information or action to be taken, and ensure that the person is
authorized to receive the requested information or giving the order to perform an action (Mitnick
& Simon, 2002).
Social engineering penetration tests are important for management to assure and monitor that
the users have comprehended the security education and training. This could be done through
implementing regular security exercises using weaker forms of penetration tests. These exercises
reinforce the training and education programs. It also keeps the users alert, and more prepared in
the occasion of an actual attack (Barrett, 2003)(Nohlberg & Kowalski, 2008).
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2.2.3 Technical controls
Technical controls are countermeasures that are implemented to block a malicious mail at the
gateway, prevent a user to browse on malicious web pages, or prevent malware to be installed on
a computer.
Sender policy framework works as an email validation system designed to prevent email spam
by detecting email spoofing by verifying that a sending host is authorized to send mail on behalf
of the source domain. This measure should make it easier for the human recipient to recognize
that the sending domain is legitimate for the targeted organization (Tally, Thomas, & Vleck,
2004),(Milletary, 2005).
Content-based email filter is a countermeasure that is installed at the company’s network
boundary (mail gateway). It analyses the e-mail content and prevents phishing e-mail from
reaching the users and thus stopping the attack at an early stage of the attack (Bergholz,
2010),(Huang, Tan, & Liu, 2009).
Blacklist function is a measure that is included in the browser. The browser queries lists of
blacklisted and whitelisted domains and makes sure that a user is not accessing any malicious
phishing sites. The blacklist requires active monitoring and needs to be updated on a regular
basis (Hong, 2012),(Huang et al., 2009).
Little research has been done on the effectiveness of commonly proposed countermeasures
against social engineering-based malware installation attacks and if there exists potential
dependencies between those countermeasures. In an attempt towards fulfilling the gap, data was
collected by interviewing content domain experts.

3. Data collection
Six semi-structured interviews were utilized in order to capture rich, detailed information on
content experts’ views of the investigated domain in general, and countermeasures against social
engineering attacks in particular. The number of respondents was decided due to the following
reasons: i) the study is of exploratory nature, and ii) a too high number of respondents will make
thorough interpretations of the interviews difficult (Kvale, 1986).
The interviews were carried out from February 2012 to June 2012. All respondents had acquired
a deep domain specific knowledge through experience of the topic on a regular basis. Two of the
respondents were academics, and are both well-regarded in the research field and have many
years of practical experience. Four respondents were practitioners. They were selected on
recommendations, and had all worked extensively within the investigated domain. Respondent
data is summarized in table 1.
Respondent

Position

Experience (Years)

1

Professor and scientist (private industry)

>15

1

2

Senior Consultant

16

1.5

3

Consultant

5

1.5

4

Head of Security (private industry)

12

2.5

5

Associate professor

>10

2

6

Senior security researcher (private industry)

>15

1

4

Time (Hours)

Table 1: Respondent data
Three of the interviews were carried out face-to-face at the expert’s respective places of business
and three over telephone due to geographical issues. Due to the complexity of acquiring
assessment on the effectiveness of the countermeasures effort was spent to enforce reliability of
results. That is, the original layout and scope of the data collection was somewhat changed
according to the focus area(s) of the respondents. For example, no answers were forced, the
scales were allowed to be switched for a ranking system, and the respondents were allowed to
traverse from the original scope if needed. For example, if they wanted to discuss a particular
countermeasure in greater detail. As a consequence, more time was spent on those matters the
respondents perceived to be of greater importance for the topic of the study.
The interviews all had the same general approach, and consisted of three main objectives: (i) to
gain a deeper understanding of social engineering-based malware installation attacks, (ii) to
discuss the relevance (if the experts perceived that the countermeasures are not only useful in
theory but will also possible to implement in practice) and comprehensiveness (if there are any
countermeasures missing to capture the content domain) of the countermeasures proposed by the
literature (cf. section 2.2), (iii) to assess the effectiveness of countermeasures that were the
output of objective (ii) through a scale of 1-5, where 1 meant “do not increase the difficulty of
successful attack” and 5 “greatly increase the difficulty of successful attack” and (iv) to discuss
potential relationships between countermeasures, i.e., if the experts perceive that any
combination of countermeasures provides greater effectiveness, and which combinations that
they perceive don’t provide any greater effectiveness.

4. Data collection results and discussions
During the first interview the expert commented on the importance of clearly defining the profile
of the attacker and to clarify what the attacker wants to obtain by attacking an organization or
individual, i.e., is the attacker after generic or specific information of an organization. It is
expected that the effort required to defend against a targeted attack is much higher than for a
generic attack and the experts therefore perceived that the type of attack affect the effectiveness
of the countermeasures. Therefore, only when clearly defining the attacker an assessment of
countermeasure effectiveness can be done. As a consequence effort was spent on clearly defining
the type of attacker and the type of attack that is performed.
Three categories of attacks were defined: a hyper-targeted attack, a semi-targeted attack or a
generic attack. In a hyper-targeted attack, the attacker is a professional social engineer with a
large amount of resources, has spent time preparing the attack and obtained a considerable
amount of context-specific information that makes the effect of any implemented
countermeasure rather weak. In a semi-targeted attack, an attacker has obtained some contextspecific information, hasn’t the same amount of resources and don’t spend as much time on
preparing the attack (the most common attack according to the experts). A generic attack is
usually carried out be a less professional attacker (also known as “script kiddie”) which uses a
spam-like approach and relies heavily on publically available automated phishing tools.
For the purpose of the present study, the attacker was defined as an attacker that is performing a
semi-targeted attack and has obtained some context-specific information. This definition was
introduced in the remaining interview sessions.
5

4.1 Opinions on the type of attacks
The experts agreed that the attack is more likely to be regarded successful if the attack aims to
compromise a computer from anyone in an organization than a specific piece of information that
a specific person has access to. For instance, clicking on malicious link can be enough to install
malware through a drive by download on a randomly chosen user computer. However, if the
attacker is after a specific piece of information, the specific information owner needs to install
the malware. This will require a targeted attack where context-specific information needs to be
obtained. This information can be obtained by gathering information from the target organization
in the preparation of the attack.
Regarding the two attack types (phishing and malware installation through portable media), the
experts perceived that they have both the same main purpose – to install malware on a user
computer. Given the purpose of the study, the experts perceived that it isn’t necessary to have
two attack types as they both use social and technical means to make users’ install malware on
their computer and therefore suggested merging these two attack types into one broader attack
type. Consequently, the two attack types were aggregated to one variable.

4.2 Opinions on the countermeasures
4.2.1 Opinions on security policies
A policy that restricts Internet usage is perceived to be difficult to implement in an entire
organization. Five experts argued that the best way to protect user is to keep them away from
malware. Therefore it’s suggested that such a policy should be implemented on the computers to
control the use of browsers versions and websites that employees are allowed to browse. This
policy works to prevent users form accessing hostile content on the Internet and limit access to
sites people actually need to access during work hours. The experts recommended replacing the
Internet use policy with a broader policy denoted as Technology acceptable use policy and also
include acceptable email usage.
Regarding acceptable installation of additional software the experts suggested that a combination
of two measures can be used. The first measure can be a written policy that addresses acceptable
installation of additional software (Acceptable installation policy) and the second
countermeasure is a policy installed on the computer to Minimize user privileges (the experts
prescribe the change of Separation of duties policy to the procedure Minimizing user privileges).
The latter countermeasure both limit users access rights to information that users need in their
daily work and make it impossible for regular users to install software on their work computers
without having administrator privileges. The experts further agreed that a policy that addresses
the acceptable use and disposal of portable media is useful and can be implemented in practice.
However, they suggested renaming the measure to Device acceptable use policy.

4.2.2 Opinions on user interventions
Training users to recognize and react to malware attacks is perceived to provide good results.
However, the experts’ opinions are rather varying. One expert perceived that it’s not useful to
train users as at least one user will always be fooled by the social engineer and install the
malware in spite of educational efforts. For instance, this expert believed that if a device is
desirable enough, the user will connect the device to a computer and thereby install malware.
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However, the experts agreed that for an attack through portable media, user training is more
effective than for a phishing attack as they perceive that it’s easier to implement such training in
practice. Regarding verification procedures, the experts agreed that if the attack is targeted, the
measure is not effective at all as the attacker will bypass the measure using effective
manipulative skills. The experts agreed that social engineering penetration tests are well-invested
efforts if the results are used effectively. The penetration tests assess how well implemented
measures function and identifies weaknesses in the security defense chain. The tests increase the
security awareness and make future educational efforts more effective.
Based on the expert recommendations, the measures awareness education and training program
and verification and authorization procedures was aggregated to User security training. Social
engineering penetration test was replaced with Performance monitoring.

4.2.3 Opinions on technical countermeasures
The experts agreed that technical countermeasures are important and should be able to recognize
if an attached link or software is malicious. The experts suggested three layers of technical
measures. The first layer prevents a malicious mail from reaching its target. This layer consists
of parameters related to email protection on a mail server level. Anti-spam technology analyzes
the structure of an incoming mail at the gateway. Antivirus technology checks for virus
signatures, content filter analysis the email to identify any suspicious content, and outbreak filter
analyses the attached link to the website (based on blacklist technology). If the filter doesn’t
recognize the link to the website, it’s quarantined and scanned for virus and if virus is identified
the mail is blocked. The experts recommended the countermeasure that prevents a malicious mail
from reaching its target to be referred as Email protection.
The second layer consists of parameters related to the protection against malware installation on
a user’s desktop computer. This layer consist of measures such as antivirus, antimalware, content
filter, outbreak filter and web reputation filter that analyses the IP address to the webserver. If the
webserver is listed as malicious, the user is not able to browse to the malicious website. The
experts recommended naming the measure Desktop anti-malware.
The final measure is activated when a user has installed malware on a computer. The measure
works to monitor and detect malicious outgoing traffic. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs)
usually serve this purpose.

4.2.4 Countermeasures to add according to the experts
Regarding the comprehensiveness of the countermeasures, the experts recommended to add five
countermeasures. Intrusion detection system was added to monitor and detect malicious outgoing
traffic. For data hygiene, two measures were recommended: a formal Patch management process
that regularly updates used software and a process that monitors the services being used and
Disable unnecessary services if needed. Thus, minimizing service being used and maximizing
software updates. A Device control measure was added to handle attempts to install malware
through portable media. This measure includes virus scanning when the user connects the media
and that the auto-run function is turned off. The experts finally agreed that Information security
leadership is very important for effective implementation and manage of all other measures, and
to get sponsorship for every security effort being made or planned to be made in an organization.
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4.3 Effectiveness of countermeasures
The quantitative estimates made by the respondents can be seen in Table 2. These estimates are
made under the assumption that no measure other than the one studied is present. The
effectiveness of the measures was studied based on the changes as recommended by the experts
and their effectiveness against an attacker that is conducting a semi-targeted malware installation
attack and has obtained some context-specific information. Notable is that the two respondents
did not feel comfortable providing quantitative estimates of 1-5, they preferred High (H),
Medium (M), and Low (L) instead. The results point to a consensus regarding most measures.
There is agreement regarding Information security leadership to be the most effective measure.
However, the consensus regarding User security training is rather low. The respondents perceive
it to be important, but the effectiveness depends on the degree of obtained context-information
that an attacker can use to gain trust.
Attack

Countermeasure

R1

R2

R3

R4

R5

R6

Malware installation attack

Technology acceptable use policy
(TAUP)

-

2

2

2

-

L

Acceptable installation policy (AIP)

2

4

4

3

L

M

Device acceptable use policy (DAUP)

-

4

4

2

L

M

User security training (UST)

2

4

3

4

H

L

Performance monitoring (Pmon)

2

4

3

3

M

L

Patch management (Pman)

-

3

3

3

M

H

Disabling unnecessary services (DUS)

-

-

2

2

M

H

Minimizing user privileges (MUP)

4

3

-

-

M

H

Email protection (EP)

3

4

3

4

M

M

Desktop anti-malware (DAM)

4

4

4

4.5

-

H

Intrusion detection system (IDS)

3

3

3

3

-

H

Device control (DC)

3

4

2

4

M

-

Information security leadership (ISL)

5

4

4

4

-

-

Table 2: Estimates of the effectiveness of countermeasures

4.4 Effectiveness of countermeasures in combination
Oftentimes, the effectiveness of one countermeasure can be thought of as dependent on the
presence of another. The result of the data collection on this topic is depicted in table 3. A “0“
means that the combination of countermeasures is not perceived to result in a significant
increased effectiveness. A “+” means that the combination is perceived to result in a significantly
increased effectiveness. A “*” means that a data collection event did not detail the perceived
dependency between two countermeasures. Interview 1 is the first symbol in each cell, interview
2 the second, interview 3 the third, and so forth. For example, the combination between
Acceptable installation policy (AIP) and Performance monitoring (Pmon) has the symbols
“0+++*+“. That is, respondent 1 (R1) did not perceive the combination to result in any
significant increased effectiveness, and as such the first symbol is “0“. The second, third, fourth
8

and sixth respondents (R2, R3, R4 and R6) perceived a significant increased effectiveness of the
combination, and thus the second, third, fourth and sixth symbols are “+”. Finally, the fifth
respondent did feel comfortable to assess the effectiveness in combination; and thus the fifth
symbol is“*”.
Some interesting results are now discussed. All experts perceived that Information security
leadership (ISL) in combination with the other countermeasures increases the effectiveness of the
protection against malware installation. User security training (UST) is perceived to increase the
effectiveness in combination with all measures except Patch management (Pman), Disable
unnecessary services (DUS) and Minimizing user privileges (MUP). This is expected as these
measures are oftentimes managed by a centralized IT department and do not have a direct
interaction with the user. However, Email protection (EP) and Desktop-antimalware (DAM) for
instance, are perceived to have a greater effectiveness in combination with user training. The
reason for this is that the experts perceived that the technical measures should work to both
prevent a malicious email from reaching its target and make it impossible for a user to install
malware on a computer. However, if the mail reaches the user and the computers antimalware is
not implemented or well-maintained; the training should prevent the user from installing the
attached malware. Therefore it is believed that these countermeasures, together, make it more
difficult for an attacker to successfully install malware on a user computer. Device control (DC)
and Acceptable installation policy (AIP) is perceived to increase the effectiveness in combination
by five out of six experts. On the other hand, the countermeasure specifically related to malware
installed using devices is generally not perceived to be effective in combination with measures
implemented for phishing attacks. The reason behind this is logical and based on the fact that
these measures are simply not relevant in combination.
In this study we examined the combination of two countermeasures at a time. Examining more
than two countermeasures at a time would be interesting, although very time consuming, and
there could be a risk that it would be difficult to assess the effectiveness of more than two
countermeasures in combination, in particular using human judgment. As the results show, the
experts in this study perceive that some combinations do not increase the effectiveness in
combination. Future research could examine if these results hold when collecting data from a
larger sample.

4.5 Discussions on the interview methodology
To address bias in this study, the data collection was carried out using the same procedure using
a structured procedure. Also, no respondent had any previous affiliation with the interviewer. To
handle the complexity of the research purpose, the questionnaire was broken down into a
sequence of different topics. The sub-session corresponding to each of these topics were
introduced by the interviewer at the beginning of each session. Another potential bias is that
respondents, if pressured, can provide answers which they do not really believe in. This is of
particular significance to a study such as the present, with complex high-level questions that can
be perceived as difficult to answer. To counter this issue, no answers were forced. Furthermore,
the format of the estimates could be changed to better suit the respondent. These options were
utilized twice in the present study: one respondent did not feel comfortable assessing the
effectiveness of countermeasures in combination and two respondents did not feel comfortable
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with the measurement scale of “mean effectiveness”. As a consequence, the interview instrument
was revised during these occasions to accommodate their needs.

TAUP
AIP
DAUP
UST

AIP

DAUP

UST

Pmon Pman DUS

DAM

IDS

DC

0++***

++++*+ ++++*+ ++++*+
0+++** 0+++*+ 0+++*+ 0+++++

Pman

*****0 **00*0 ***0*0 ***0*0 ***0*0

DUS

EP

0000*0 ++++*+

Pmon

MUP
EP
DAM
IDS
DC
ISL

MUP

***0*0 ***0*0 ***0*0 ***0*0 ***0*0 ***0*0
**00*0
0+++*+
0**+**
0****0
0000*0
++++*+

++++*+ ++++*+ **00*0 0000*0 0000*0 00++*+
0+++*+ *000** ++++*+ 0++0*+ *****0 **00*0 +**+**
++++*+ ++++** ++++*+ 0000*0 *+++*+ 0****0 *****0 *+++*+
0**0*0 0**0*0 ++++*+ 0000*0 ***0** *00**0 *00**0 ++++*+ 0+++*+
++++*+ ++++** ++++*+ 0++**0 0****0 0****0 **+**0 0000*0 ++++*+ 0000*0
++++*+ ++++*+ ++++*+ ++++*+ ++++*+ ++++*+ ++++*+ ++++*+ ++++*+ ++++*+ ++++*+

Table 3: Dependencies between countermeasures. “+”denotes perceived increased effectiveness,
“0“denotes no perceived increased effectiveness, and “*”denotes that the combination was not
scored.

5. Conclusions
In this study, we have attempted to obtain a deeper understanding of how to defend against social
engineering-based malware installation attacks. We have conducted six semi-structured
interviews with experts to discuss the relevance and comprehensiveness of a set of
countermeasures that were identified be performing a literature review. Data was then collected
on the effectiveness of the individual countermeasures that the experts perceived to be relevant
and if any dependencies between them exist.
The result of the interviews indicates that experts perceive that some countermeasures are more
important and can be more easily implemented in practice than others. The consensus regarding
the effectiveness of email protection, desktop anti-malware and intrusion detection system is
rather high. However, for some countermeasures (e.g. user security training and device control)
the consensus among the experts regarding the countermeasure effectiveness is rather low. The
experts perceive that the most important countermeasure is information security leadership as it
affects the effectiveness of all other countermeasures.
The study is of exploratory nature and as the field is still immature there is still research left to be
conducted. The results from this study can be seen as hypothetical relations between social
engineering concepts that can be further validated in future studies. In line with the nature of the
study we aim at continuing our research by conducting several validation steps. Currently, we are
conducting several case studies were we are collecting survey data, conducting observations and
unannounced phishing experiments. Through these studied we will attempt to measure actual
effectiveness of measures against a social engineering-based malware installation attack.
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